Missing Nukes from the US Air Force: Treason of the Highest Order
by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Oct. 29, 2010
Global Research Editor's Note
On October 27, 2010, a computer failure emerged at the FE Warren Air force Base in Wyoming. "Mr President we've lost control of FIFTY nuclear warheads"
"Pentagon chiefs were stunned to discover that a U.S. air force base had lost control of 50 nuclear, inter-continental missiles.
A power failure meant that one-ninth of America’s nuclear arsenal went offline for three-quarters of an hour, it emerged yesterday. Minuteman missile: Computer breakdown meant the U.S. Air Force lost control for 45 minutes
As multiple error codes appeared on the computer control system at FE Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, the Minuteman III missiles went into ‘LF Down’ status, which meant that officers were unable to communicate with them.
Defence officials insisted yesterday there was never any danger of an accidental launch. But the incident was deemed serious enough for Barack Obama to be briefed on it later. (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1324190/Obama-told-nuclear-arsenal-hit-45-minute-glitch.html?ito=feeds-newsxml)
The failure involved the launch control computers at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, "causing a loss of communication with the missiles".
"The failure also meant that certain security protocols were down as well. While the missiles were still able to be launched, control was only possible via an airborne communications platform." Failure at U.S. Air Force Base Takes 50 Nukes Offline)
This is not the first time there is a "glitch" in the control over America's nuclear arsenal. Invariably, these failures are not reported.
A far more serious incident emerged in August 2007. As documented by CRG Research Associate Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, several nuclear warheads actually disappeared.
In total there were six W80-1 nuclear warheads armed on AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) that were “lost.”
This was not a computer glitch. It was something far more serious.
"There is a rigorous, almost inflexible, chain of command in regards to the handling of nuclear weapons".
Why then did these nuclear warheads go missing?
Nazemroaya's research suggests that "unauthorized removal" of nuclear warheads is an impossibility unless the chain of command is bypassed, "involving the deliberate tampering of the paperwork and tracking procedures."
The incident went virtually unreported and was casually categorized by the media as "negligence".
See Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya's detailed analysis, published in October 2007, on how these nukes went missing.
Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, October 28, 2010
The original October 2007 Global Research article
Missing Nukes on August 29-30, 2007
According to a wide range of reports, several nuclear bombs were “lost” for 36 hours after taking off August 29/30, 2007 on a “cross-country journey” across the U.S., from U.S.A.F Base Minot in North Dakota to U.S.A.F. Base Barksdale in Louisiana.  Reportedly, in total there were six W80-1 nuclear warheads armed on AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) that were “lost.”  The story was first reported by the Military Times, after military servicemen leaked the story.
It is also worth noting that on August 27, 2007, just days before the "lost" nukes incident, three B-52 Bombers were performing special missions under the direct authorization of General Moseley, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.  The exercise was reported as being an aerial information and image gathering mission. The base at Minot is also home of the 91st Space Wings, a unit under the command of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
According to official reports, the U.S. Air Force pilots did not know that they were carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Once in Louisiana, they also left the nuclear weapons unsecured on the runway for several hours. 
U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Major-General Richard Y. Newton III commented on the incident, saying there was an “unprecedented” series of procedural errors, which revealed “an erosion of adherence to weapons-handling standards” 
These statements are misleading. The lax security was not the result of procedural negligence within the U.S. Air Force, but rather the consequence of a deliberate tampering of these procedures.
If a soldier, marine, airman, or sailor were even to be issued a rifle and rifle magazine — weaponry of a far lesser significance, danger, and cost — there is a strict signing and accountability process that involves a chain of command and paperwork. This is part of the set of military checks and balances used by all the services within the U.S. Armed Forces.
Military servicemen qualified to speak on the subject will confirm that there is a stringent nuclear weapons handling procedure. There is a rigorous, almost inflexible, chain of command in regards to the handling of nuclear weapons and not just any soldier, sailor, airman, or marine is allowed to handle nuclear weapons. Only servicemen specialized in specific handling and loading procedures, are perm certified to handle, access and load nuclear warheads.
Every service personnel that moves or even touches these weapons must sign a tracking paper and has total accountability for their movement. There is good reason for the paperwork behind moving these weapons. The military officers that order the movement of nuclear weapons, including base commanders, must also fill out paper forms.
In other words, unauthorized removal of nuclear weapons would be virtually impossible to accomplish unless the chain of command were bypassed, involving, in this case, the deliberate tampering of the paperwork and tracking procedures.
The strategic bombers that carried the nuclear weapons also could not fly with their loaded nuclear weaponry without the authorization of senior military officials and the base commander. The go-ahead authorization of senior military officials must be transmitted to the servicemen that upload the nuclear weapons. Without this authorization no flights can take place.
In the case of the missing nukes, orders were given and flight permission was granted. Once again, any competent and eligible U.S. Air Force member can certify that this is the standard procedure.
There are two important questions to be answered in relation to the "lost" nukes incident:
1. Who gave the order to arm the W80-1 thermonuclear warheads on the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs)? At what level in the military hierarchy did this order originate? How was the order transmitted down the command chain?
2. If this was not a procedural error, what was the underlying military-political objective sought by those who gave the orders?
The Impossibility of "Losing" Nuclear Weapons