'저는 그들의 땅을 지키기 위하여 싸웠던 인디안들의 이야기를 기억합니다. 백인들이 그들의 신성한 숲에 도로를 만들기 위하여 나무들을 잘랐습니다. 매일밤 인디안들이 나가서 백인들이 만든 그 길을 해체하면 그 다음 날 백인들이 와서 도로를 다시 짓곤 했습니다. 한동안 그 것이 반복되었습니다. 그러던 어느날, 숲에서 가장 큰 나무가 백인들이 일할 동안 그들 머리 위로 떨어져 말과 마차들을 파괴하고 그들 중 몇몇을 죽였습니다. 그러자 백인들은 떠났고 결코 다시 오지 않았습니다….' (브루스 개그논)





For any updates on the struggle against the Jeju naval base, please go to savejejunow.org and facebook no naval base on Jeju. The facebook provides latest updates.
Showing posts with label Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Show all posts

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Text Fwd: Gates: U.S. Troops, Missiles In Japan Needed Against China, N. Korea

* Texts sent by Rick Rozoff on Jan. 14, 2011

Stars and Stripes
January 13, 2011
Gates: U.S. troops needed in Japan to keep China, North Korea in check
By Kevin Baron

-In a sweeping assessment of the U.S.-Japan security stance, Gates said the two countries require “more effective” missile defense capabilities. He praised the existing system as “one of the most advanced of its kind in the world,” and hailed the advanced SM-3 interceptor’s ability to thwart a North Korean attack. Both countries will continue to share missile defense commands at Yokota Air Base.



TOKYO: The U.S. needs troops in Japan for the long term to keep China’s rising power in check and contain North Korea’s aggressive nuclear and missile aspirations, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said....

“On account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant and more important than ever,” Gates said Friday in a keynote speech at Tokyo’s Keio University.

Without U.S. armed forces in Japan, Gates said North Korea’s military provocations could be “even more outrageous,” China might act more aggressively, disaster assistance would take longer, joint exercises would be harder to execute and the U.S. would have less intelligence on the region.

In a sweeping assessment of the U.S.-Japan security stance, Gates said the two countries require “more effective” missile defense capabilities. He praised the existing system as “one of the most advanced of its kind in the world,” and hailed the advanced SM-3 interceptor’s ability to thwart a North Korean attack. Both countries will continue to share missile defense commands at Yokota Air Base.

Gates made clear that the U.S. intends to move forward with Futenma relocation according to the newly agreed plan adopted last year, although he took a softer tone in remarks Thursday and at the defense ministry. That marked a change from past visits in which Gates had pressed Japan to get on with the move.

[He]warned that Chinese advances in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose “a potential challenge” to U.S. military’s Pacific operations and communications “in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology.”
....
Speaking a week after introducing Pentagon plans to reduce the size of the U.S. military and pull back on costly weapons buys, Gates said Japan will need to take on more of its security responsibilities.

“In the United States, we are engaged in a robust debate about the size, composition and cost of our military,” Gates said. “... We will continue to maintain the military strength necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies and deter potential adversaries from acts of aggression and intimidation. To do this we need a committed and capable security partner in Japan.”

Gates praised Japan’s recent agreement to stand “shoulder-to-shoulder” with South Korea, saying their increased military activities around the world are a key rationale for recommending Japan join the United Nations Security Council.

For now, regional security remains wholly dependent on the U.S.

Yet as Gates openly advocates for negotiations with North Korea, he sounded clearly pessimistic heading to Seoul.

“Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community,” he said, “the character and priorities of the North Korean regime have sadly not changed.”

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Gates: Japan Must Take Larger Military Role In Asia, Against China
Los Angeles Times
January 13, 2011
Japan must take broader military role in East Asia, Gates says
:The U.S. and Japan need to broaden their military alliance to deal with any threats from North Korea and China, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says. U.S. bases in Japan are a valuable deterrent, he says.
By David S. Cloud


General: U.S. Ready To "Demolish" North Korean Missile Sites
Arirang News
January 14, 2011
US Preparing to Strike N. Korea If ICBM Threats Increase
Choi You-sun


U.S., Japanese Defense Chiefs Plan Transfer Of Interceptor Missiles
Japan Times
January 14, 2011
Kitazawa, Gates to speed talks on SM-3
By MASAMI ITO

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Text Fwd: Think Tank Weighs In On US-Japan Security 미 정책 기관, 미-일 안보 동맹 저울질

AFP/Getty Images
U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma base in Ginowan located in Okinawa prefecture.


* Text from Martha Duenas on Oct. 27, 2010

The Wall Street Journal
Think Tank Weighs In On US-Japan Security
Chester Dawson
October 27, 2010, 5:20 AM JST

Whither the U.S-Japan security alliance?That’s an eternal question for security policy think tank types who are always on the lookout for the next inflection point.

Indeed, a new report due out Wednesday from the Washington, D.C.-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS) sees the bilateral relationship at a — surprise, surprise — “turning point…amid a strategic environment of unprecedented complexity.” Yet the report also points out the half-century old U.S. Japan Mutual Security Treaty has had a solid track record of helping to keep the peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Among the more provocative suggestions for policymakers: consider pulling back some forward stationed U.S. military forces in Japan and moving them as far away as Guam or Hawaii.

The report, an advance copy of which was obtained by The Wall Street Journal, provides an overview of challenges facing the alliance timed to coincide with the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting of regional leaders in Yokohama next month. It specifies several areas in need of “revitalization,” including greater interoperability of the two countries’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) programs. It also bluntly calls on Japan to create a National Security Council and to boost its arsenal by adding drones (“long-haul, unmanned aerial vehicles”), diesel attack submarines and naval mines. And the report suggests four core options for the U.S. military base presence in Japan:

1.) Retain and Harden: Maintain current base structure and bolster their potency by deploying more missile defenses and “pouring additional concrete on shelters and burying facilities.”

2.) Fortify Guam: Shift more American military personnel from Japan to the island of Guam while building up its air and naval facilities.

3.) Disperse: Spread the U.S. military footprint across more of Oceania by redeploying forces from Japan and improve access to military installations in Southeast Asia.

4.) Pullback to Hawaii: Move some U.S. forces in Japan to Hawaii and upgrade their capability to redeploy quickly during a regional crisis.

The CNAS predicts that it is “likely” the U.S. will implement at least some of these policy options in the future to upgrade their effectiveness and mollify localized opposition to the large U.S. military presence in Okinawa. This comes against a backdrop of a tense standoff between China and Japan recently over uninhabited but strategic islands off the southern tip of Okinawa. That diplomatic tiff has rekindled concerns in Tokyo and Washington, D.C. about the regional balance of power in light of China’s new willingness to throw its weight around. While the report refrains from embracing a policy of containment vis-à-vis Beijing, it does encourage the U.S. and Japan to begin preparations to “counter China’s anti-access and area-denial strategy.” The report was authored by a trio of Asia-Pacific security experts, including Mr. Patrick Cronin, a former director at the National Defense University and senior official at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

On a less militant (and more colorful) note, the think tank report asks both countries to work towards fostering a “blue revolution” to cope with water scarcity, a “green alliance” to deal with natural resource dependence and a “green Okinawa” policy promoting local economic development. To accomplish all of that, CNAS wants to see a so-called “Track 1.5” series of ongoing dialogues for both government and private sector officials in the U.S. and Japan. But the unmistakable undercurrent of the report seems to say: actions speak louder than words, at least on the high seas.
___________________________________________________________

Center for a New American Security
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Center for a New American Security

Abbreviation
CNAS
Formation 2007
Type Public policy think tank
Headquarters 1301 Pennsylvania Ave., Ste. 403
Location Washington, D.C.
President John Nagl
Website: http://www.cnas.org
Bold
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is a Washington, D.C.-based think tank established in 2007 by co-founders Michèle Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell which specializes in U.S. national security issues. CNAS's stated mission is to "develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values."[1] CNAS focuses on terrorism and irregular warfare, the future of the U.S. military, the emergence of Asia as a global power center, and the national security implications of natural resource consumption. Deputy Secretary of States James Steinberg has called CNAS "an indispensable feature on the Washington landscape."[2] Speaking at CNAS annual conference in June 2009, U.S. Central Command Commander GEN David Petraeus observed that "CNAS has, in a few short years, established itself as a true force in think tank and policy-making circles"[3]

The Obama administration has hired several CNAS employees for key jobs.[4] Founders Flournoy and Campbell currently serve as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, respectively. In June 2009 The Washington Post suggested, "In the era of Obama...the Center for a New American Security may emerge as Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs."[4] CNAS scholars include John Nagl,[5] David Kilcullen, Andrew Exum, Thomas E. Ricks, and Marc Lynch.
CNAS is relatively small, with around 30 employees and a budget under $6 million.[6] Despite its small size, CNAS is influential within the national security policy community, and has been able to “punch above our weight”, according to former CNAS Director of External Relations and now-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Price Floyd[7].

Monday, July 19, 2010

Text Fwd:[Masanao Kano] "Tokyo must answer Okinawa's cries of agony"

* Text Fwd from J. D. on July 14, 2010

Asahi Newspaper
SPECIAL TO THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
POINT OF VIEW/ Masanao Kano: Tokyo must answer Okinawa's cries of agony
2010/07/14

Tokyo and Washington have reached a new agreement on the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture. While the accord is extremely close to the existing plan, there are also signs that the Okinawa problem might move forward, albeit slightly.

Last year's change of government gave hope to the people of Okinawa that they may finally be about to part company with the politics of necessitarianism; in doing so, they inevitably made the U.S. bases problem one that does not concern Okinawa alone, but the entire nation. The movement to reject U.S. military bases started with a sit-in protest in Nago's Henoko district at the close of the last century, and has already reached the stage of no-return.

As a mainlander, while shaken by the events in Okinawa, I feel the situation has given rise to a wide variety of flashpoints that could spark ideological controversy. Why does Okinawa alone have to suffer? The frustration and anger that arose among residents led to cries of "discrimination" and a "rift" with the rest of Japan.

With Okinawa's agony etched in my mind, I can recognize that at least two major questions are being addressed to us.

One is that the core assertion of Okinawans is not "relocation" of U.S. bases but their "removal" and "closure" altogether. The assertion is based on three political viewpoints:

* Their judgment that they do not need the U.S. Marine presence;

* Their refusal to entertain any attempt to strengthen the functions of the bases in the guise of relocation; and

* Their determination that they will no longer accept the status quo of having to make an agonizing choice or settle for second best.

Another reason they argue for the removal and closure of the bases is that they don't want to pass their burdens on to others through relocation of the facilities.

In short, their awareness is changing. They are now hoping to exist without bases, as many mainland people do, instead of continuing to share the sufferings of other base-hosting communities.

In trying to sever the negative chain reaction of shared suffering, they are also trying to fight on behalf of Tokunoshima island in Kagoshima Prefecture as well as Guam and Tinian in the western Pacific Ocean, thereby transcending national borders.

They are concerned that the rights to self-determination of those islanders could be disregarded.

The other point is that the vast majority of Okinawans share the historical view that their island prefecture's primary role for the past 65 years has been to serve as a site for U.S. military bases.

Okinawa reverted to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. But the significance of that date is rapidly fading in their minds.

When the hand-over of sovereignty was decided in the late 1960s, Seizen Nakasone (1907-1995), a teacher who led the Himeyuri student corps, a group of female high school students who served as a nursing unit for the Imperial Japanese Army during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, heaved a sigh of grief. He said, "For the past 24 years, we have been calling for reversion to Japan. What we achieved is the situation in which we must keep repeating, from square one, the movement to call for a reduction of bases."

Looking back, we realize that is precisely what Okinawa has kept doing, just as Nakasone predicted.

This status aroused anger and grief among Okinawans because they thought that Okinawa had yet to enter the postwar period in a proper sense. At the time of the Battle of Okinawa, Tokyo positioned Okinawa as "a sacrifice stone." U.S. forces occupying the island saw it as "a keystone."

It means that the Japanese government is trying to use Okinawa as a sacrifice stone to host the new base, which is a keystone for security policy. It also ensures that the new base is not built on the mainland.

Okinawa has been forced to bear the excessive burden of hosting bases under the pretext of deterrence in the event of emergencies. This "abnormal" situation has lasted so long that local people are numb to it. In that sense, the rejection of bases is none other than a declaration of their determination to take a new approach to the longstanding issue.

Okinawans have had many years to fine-tune their thoughts on the inequality they face in hosting so many U.S. bases. That is all the more reason they form those questions directly at the mainland.

It behooves us to squarely face another question; that is, whether the mainland has really thought about military emergencies. Rather, have we not taken the Japan-U.S. security alliance for granted and, in the process, become lackadaisical? These questions punch home.

So, how should we answer these questions posed by Okinawa? I believe what the Japanese government must do at this juncture is not to focus on the problem as a domestic issue but hold face-to-face talks with Washington and the U.S. military.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. As a political problem, the movement in Okinawa put before us the question whether the Japan-U.S. security system should be kept as it is. It may be a distant goal to abolish the security alliance.

But at least the government should present a package of three proposals:

* That the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement be revised;

* That sympathy budget allocations for U.S. forces stationed in Japan be scrapped; and

* That the Futenma airfield be closed.

Only when it does, can this year be the start of the process to re-examine the security alliance. I think voicing such thoughts is the least we can do to respond to the cries of agony of Okinawa.

* * *

Masanao Kano is a historian specializing in modern Japanese thought.