Text Fwd: An Agenda for Engagement Between USA and DPRK

Peacemaking Issue 146

An Agenda for Engagement Between USA and DPRK
Moon J. Pak (2009/09/23 02:00)

Six-Party Talks

President Bush’s hard line approach doomed the 1994 Agreed Framework between USA and North Korea (DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).

Since then, the Six-Party Talks, 2003-2008 (USA, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea) have been the main diplomatic avenue for engagement. The US goal was to place North Korea under multiparty diplomatic scrutiny and pressure for its eventual denuclearization.

Due mostly to the bilateral negotiations carried out by seasoned diplomats Christopher Hill and Kim, Gyegwan and equally importantly due to the fact that during the period North Korea had relatively sympathetic partners among the Six-Party countries, i.e., South Korea led by progressive Roh, Moo-hyun administration, China and Russia. It did produce some tangible positive results, such as February 13, 2007 Agreement and October 3, 2007 Joint Statement for a projected the second phase.

Positive engagement shifted with the advent in South Korea of a the regime of Lee, Myung-bak, whose so called “New Right” doctrine is highly antagonistic to North Korea, and its alliance with the conservative Japanese government led by Aso, Taro. Further complicating progress were the postures of Russia and China negatively responding to what they considered to be relatively provocative actions of North Korea in relation to its missile firing (April, 2009) and her second nuclear testing (May, 2009). From the perspectives of North Korea these actions represented their way of protesting US noncompliance of the Six-Party Agreement. In effect, the US moved the goal post during the game by demanding a severely strict and obviously unacceptable “Verification Protocol” to confirm the veracity of the North Korea’s “Plutonium Data”. Thus it is not hard to understand North Korea’s reluctance to return to the Six-Party Table, where it will be an isolated “orphan”.

Direct Engagement

During the last US presidential election, there was a tremendous political awareness and sense of purpose among 1.2 million Korean Americans in their near unanimous support of the Obama candidacy. This was mainly based on Obama’s repeated commitment to engage in direct negotiations and diplomacy to resolve Korean peninsula issues. To great disappointment, Obama has so far pursued the hard-line Bush-Cheney approach denying Korean Americans the desire for a reunified Korean peninsula, economically strong, well defended and steeped in democratic principle.

In every step of the way in the modern history of Korea, from the annexation of the country by Japan in 1910, liberation in 1945, division into North and South, the Korean War (1950-53), the Armistice, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the South, America has been an integral part of the Korean tragedy. The United States, whether it is under Taft, Truman, Carter, Clinton, Bushes or finally Obama, owes it to Korean people to engage directly with whomever and whenever to resolve the Korean Issue. Our neighbors, Japan, China, Russia, members of the Six-Party Talk countries have neither the right nor the obligation or the interest to see us evolve into a unified and thriving neighbor. As a matter of fact, Koreans remember them as repeated invaders of their peninsula in the past history.

Recommended Basic Principles of Direct Engagement

In the past diplomatic negotiations and dialogs between the United States and North Korea have been marred by many unfortunate episodes arising from mutual distrusts, condescension by one side and also the lack of cultural understanding. Adherence to the following basic principles by both sides may prove conducive to the generation of an enduring agreement:

· Negotiate with mutual respect and trust with the goal of producing an agreement establishing a fair, equal and lasting partnership

· Negotiate with an understanding of reunification as the final goal of all Korean people

· Negotiate with the recognition that the emergence in the peninsula of a unified, thriving, strong and democratic Korea will be a centerpiece of stability in Northeast Asia, consistent with the long-range US interest.

Recommended Specifics of Direct Engagement

1. Establish immediately an Interim Liaison Office in each capital, Washington and Pyongyang---Shuttle diplomacy between US and DPRK is time-consuming and breeds misunderstanding. Consultation on some specific issues during negotiation is not possible in brief personal diplomatic sojourns across the Pacific. Prior to establishing a formal Liaison Office leading to the establishment of the diplomatic relationships that could come after the Peace Treaty, offices should be created in each capital staffed by persons trusted by the head of each administration. Especially the American Pyongyang Office should have staff attuned to the historical and cultural traditions of Korea and with Korean language ability as well as the understanding of the unique operational system of the government of North Korea. .

2. Quickly negotiate and declare a Moratorium on Mutual Defense Posture---The moratorium will mean cessation of any further missile firing, nuclear testing and provocation along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) for the DPRK; and cessation of any US-South Korea Joint Military Maneuvers, indication of a timeline for its Troop Withdrawal, introduction of any new military facilities, such as Missile Defense System by the US. These could in future be expanded to include reduction of their annual defense outlay; between North and South Koreas.

3. Accept the reality of Nuclear Korea---The first indication of the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula was made by General Douglas McArthur to stem the tide of Chinese soldiers entering into Korean War in late 1950. The actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea was also made by the US in violation of the Armistice provision. At every confrontation between US and North Korea --- the Pueblo incident, the downing of EC 101, Panmunjom incident, etc., the US has repeatedly threatened Pyongyang with nuclear reprisal. Currently the US Pacific fleet has nuclear capability both land based and carrier based, within a half day flight range to Pyongyang.

It is for this reason North Koreans call their nuclear weapon system as “Deterrence”. With the exception of Japan, all Six-Party Talk countries surrounding Korean peninsula are nuclear powers. Japanese military authorities have on various occasions repeatedly indicated their ability to become a nuclear power within months, utilizing their enormous stockpile of Plutonium generated from their large number of nuclear power generators.

In view of our history replete with invasions by aggressive neighbors, who are now nuclear, clearly denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is not a viable option to Koreans in both North and South. However, North Korea must declare and be prepared to place their nuclear facilities as well as existing weapons system under joint control and ownership between the two Koreas, DPRK and ROK. This will effectively alleviate international concern regarding weapons proliferation and safety.

Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula however could be an acceptable and legitimate issue when it is discussed within the framework of global denuclearization and anti-proliferation movement led by such nuclear superpowers as US, Russia, China, etc., accompanied by their own significant and meaningful denuclearization effort. During his presidential campaign, President Obama cited this visionary idea many times.

4. US-DPRK Summit---As a consequence of nearly half a century of animosity between US and DPRK, and especially in the last eight years by the Bush administration (Axis of Evil), the public image of North Korea in the US has been demonized. One way to correct the situation would be to have North Korea’s maximum leader visit the US. It could be in the form of an invitation from the White House for a summit meeting, or his visit to the UN to address its General Assembly. The event could be followed by his visit to a few other key metropolitan areas of the country.

Other Items of Mutual Interest on the Agenda of Direct Engagement

1. Rejuvenation of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Project of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)--- by US.

2. Return of the US Navy Ship “Pueblo”--- by DPRK

3. Performance of Pyongyang Symphony Orchestra in New York City as a return visit for the Pyongyang performance of New York Philharmonic last year--- by DPRK.

4. Exploratory discussion on the concept of Permanent Neutrality for the Reunified Korea---by both US, DPRK and ROK
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Moon J. Pak, M.D.
Chairman, US-DPRK Medical Science Exchange Committee (UDMEDEX)
Vice Chairman, Korean American National Coordinating Council (KANCC)
(September, 2009)
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Moon J. Pak, M.D., Ph.D.
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