Text Fwd: Spring comes but frozen situation remains on the Korean peninsula

Peace Network
Spring comes but frozen situation remains on the Korean peninsula
Feb. 15, 2011
Written by Wooksik Cheong(Representative of Peace Network),
Translated by Ikhwan Kim(Intern of Peace Network)

When it came to the military talks between North and South Korea, it was said that South Korea expected to have a positive outcome, but that did not occur. In the meeting held from 8 to 9 February, delegations from both North and South failed to reach an agreement on agendas that will be discussed in higher-level defense talks. Thus, the failure of the talks is likely to create more uncertainty about the situation of the Korean peninsula as well as the likelihood of holding the high-level defense talks in the future. If the two Koreas are unable to narrow differences over their military issues, the restoration of North – South relations will be impossible, and all these consequences are likely to have an adverse impact on the resumption of six-party talks.

The failure of the talks is primarily attributed to that North and South Korea were unable to reach an agreement on agendas for the future higher-level talks. What South Korea was able to ascertain is that there was even a conflict between the two Koreas over how to name the higher-level talks. According to the Ministry of Defense’s announcement, on the first day of the talks, the North expressed their opinions about the Cheonan warship and Yeonpyeong Island incidents and suggested a schedule for the higher-level talks discussing the defusion of military tensions on the Korean peninsula. The South countered the North’s proposal with their agenda in which North Korea should take not only responsibilities for the Cheonan warship sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling attack, but also promise not to commit such a military provocation again. As can be speculated from the titles of the talks, South Korea tried to focus and limit the talks on the Cheonan warship and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, whereas North Korea concentrated more on defusing the current military tensions.

On the second day of the talks, it seemed that North and South managed to narrow their differences on the aforementioned issues. The South suggested taking a modified title - ‘The talks on Cheonan warship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island.' It is noticeable that some part of the initial title has been omitted which is ‘provocation, responsible measures and promise not to attack again’. The North also modified their title to ‘The Cheonan warship incident, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and halting military action that can be seen as provocation between North and South’. What is recognizable in the North’s title is the shift from ‘defusing military tensions’ to ‘stopping military action which can be seen as provocation between the two Koreas’. South Korea, however, persistently insisted that the Yeonpyeong Island and Cheonan warship incidents should be discussed first, followed by the issue on defusing military tensions. North Korea did not bend their initial position that ‘all three issues should be dealt with altogether’. The talks between the two Koreas resulted in failure because of their rather different and persistent postures.

It seems as if North Korea acknowledged that there would be no progress on the talks; they argued that the Cheonan warship sinking has nothing to do with them and that incident is a grand scheme orchestrated by the South under the US’ control in order to justify the South’s hard-line policy toward the North. North Korea also reiterated its initial stance on the Yeonpyeong Island incident that the Yeonpyeong Island shelling resulted from South Korea has made Yeonpyeong Island a place of the origin of provocation by conducting live-firing drills there.

In response to the North’s assertion, the South argued that “it has been clearly turned out that North Korea will clarify its view on the Cheonan warship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling on the higher-level military talks”, and also countered the North with that “despite of casualties, victims and damages on people’s property, it does not make sense that the North considers it as not a provocation.” Earnest intentions for higher-level talks on both sides have vanished in place of fierce mud-slinging.

Although criticism of North Korea is due for their reiteration of their initial position and for walking out of the meeting room, the South Korean government also should feel bad about their performance during the talks. First of all, a negotiation is a game in which two or more parties participate. In order to achieve a positive outcome from the negotiation, one should strive to make the other to acknowledge one’s. However, South Korea only persisted with its unilateral posture in which the government tried to limit the agendas for the higher-level talks to the Cheonan warship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island incidents. The South also refused the North’s proposal that North and South Korea simultaneously discuss the two issues above, as well as halting military provocations.

It seems that the South dismissed the North’s proposal of reducing military tensions because the talks would not be able to fully focus on the Cheonan warship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island incidents. The South also deduced that the other issues of contention - such as NLL (Northern Limit Line) including live-firing drills took place in Yeonpyeong Island on the same day of the North’s shelling, psychological warfare toward North Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK)- U.S joint military drills, and so on, that North Korea is more likely to judge these movements as provocations against them – will spring up as possible alternatives to the talks.

It also seems that South Korean government does not have ability to foresee the current situation. In reality, halting of further military provocations by the North can only come to be achieved within the context of solving the current issues plaguing the North and South. Furthermore, the North's proposals of defusing military tensions can become a sensible reason for the South to push that the North fulfill the armistice agreement, stop firing artilleries cross over NLL, stop the passage of North Korean military and fishing boats across the NLL, and also cease the extraneous negative slander against South Korea.

In the wake of the failure of the talks, it is foreseen that there will increase uncertainty about the situation of the Korean peninsula. Above all, there is less likelihood of holding military talks for a while. It is because of the fact that in the working level talks, the two Koreas not only displayed strongly contrasting viewpoints over the talks, but also, in the end, the North adapted a nonchalant attitude concerning the necessity of the talks, announcing Thursday that "Our military and people no longer feel the need of meeting the South." Since the start of this year, the North largely refrained from negative talk on South Korea, but now started to promulgate again. This can be interpreted that North Korea is not concerned with ameliorating the currently icy relationship between itself and South Korea.

Given the currently breakdown of talks, the situation of the Korean peninsula is up to how things are going to be dealt with onwards. It is likely that the failure of the talks will bring about an adverse effect on both the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Another issue of contention is the resumption of the Red Cross talks. The Lee Myungbak government declared that “the South Korean government principally agrees with the North’s proposal on holding the Red Cross talks but whether it is going to be held and its exact date will depend on the outcome of the military talks”. It clearly implies that the Red Cross talks and overall North-South dialogue will lose their motivation and impetus if the military talks abruptly come to a close.

There is even lingering uncertainty over the prospect of the six-party talks. The U.S. foreign policy’s focus is now on Egypt’s democratic movement, so the Obama administration has, as a result, paid less attention to their North Korean policy. On this occasion in particular, it means the failure of the military talks shows that the Obama administration now faces another obstacle in terms of its foundational basis of foreign policy towards North Korea. The Department of State even announced Wednesday in response to the failure of the talks that "It was a missed opportunity for North Korea to demonstrate its sincerity."

Even less likely to occur are the talks between North Korea and Japan, that have up until now been carefully making its way. Naoto Kahn, the Prime Minister of Japan, showed the Japanese will that Japan will not only resolve pending issues such as abductees, nuclear and missile and so forth but also implement the normalization of its relations with North Korea. However, the impetus for the North - South relations and the six-party talks have greatly diminished, so that it has also become difficult to revitalize the motivation for the North Korean – Japanese talks.

While the Korean talks remain frozen, one of the largest ROK-US joint military exercises – ‘Key Resolve’ – is to be conducted along with ‘Eagle drill’. It is also likely that on the first anniversary of Cheonan warship sinking in March, the criticism of the North will rise amid the commemoration of the warship's victims. What must be also taken into account is, the by-election in April in South Korea has become more important, as the government and ruling party might fall into temptation to use ‘North Wind’ (propaganda using North Korea) prior to the by-election. It is also hard to predict the North's behavior, since they have already acknowledged that the way to solve the problems through conciliatory dialogue has failed.

The climate of South Korea is now on the verge of greeting and entering the season of spring after it has endured its unprecedented and worst cold. But, it does not seem that the current situation of the Korean peninsular that was completely frozen up last year shows a sign to get out of its status quo.